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Abstract
One of the key sub-sectors in the aviation industry includes that of engine manufacturers, who
have long led technological advancement and the battle to reduce airline carbon emissions. How-
ever, these same companies have been susceptible to a number of issues that have been central to
international airlines due to higher costs and competition pressures. When an aviation disaster oc-
curs, there is widespread allocation of blame and responsibility, which has left engine manufacturers
exposed until the true cause is identified. This can generate many issues with regards to reputa-
tional damage and ability to generate finance. We set out to analyse such interactions over time and
region. Our results indicate that engine manufacturers have had to contend with substantial income
and financial leverage issues in the aftermath of a major aviation disaster, irrespective of whether
they have been identified as a causation factor in the incident itself. Further, we clearly identify
that there exists an average one day loss of 1.64% in the immediate aftermath of aviation incidents.
Substantial corporate instability is found to persist without the company being in any way respon-
sible for the incident. Shortly thereafter, contagion effects increase as speculation diminishes and
more factual evidence arrives. The role of social media is examined as a potential contributory factor.
Keywords: Aviation Disasters; Contagion; Engine Manufacturers; Financial Markets;
Reputational Risks; Tourism; Transport.
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1. Introduction
In 2018, a record 4.4 billion passengers travelled by air worldwide on 46.1 million flights and the
demand for air transport is apparent with almost 82% of all available seats being filled, with 22,000
city pairs connected by direct flights. However the gloss is overshadowed, as there were over 500
fatalities in 2018, which accounted for a fatal accident rate of 0.36 per million flights, or one fatal
accident for every 3 million flights, predominantly because of the two 737 Max 8 related accidents,
which were subsequently grounded. The previous year had a global fatality rate of 12.2 fatalities
per billion passengers, representing the safest year ever on the record for aviation.1,2 Airline safety
reputation as perceived by passengers plays a substantial role in airline choices (Siomkos [2000]) and
flight choices (Molin et al. [2017]). Fatal accidents in commercial aviation remain rare and the safety
of commercial passenger aviation services is of major concern for the travelling public and regulatory
agencies. Liu and Zeng [2007] found that demand for air travel is likely to fall as the fatality rate
increases. Airline accidents trigger instantaneous activity in the financial markets because of their
unanticipated and cataclysmic nature. This type of negative rhetoric has caused sharp reductions in
the share price of companies throughout the world, but it significantly impacts the aviation industry
when compared to other consortiums of commercial enterprises (Kaplanski and Levy [2010]). They
can have significant effects on an airline’s stock price and profitability (Chance and Ferris [1987];
Borenstein and Zimmerman [1988]; Bruning and Kuzma [1989]; Mitchell and Maloney [1989]; Rose
[1992]; Dionne et al. [1997]; Nethercurtt and Pruitt [1997]; Bosch et al. [1998]). Akyildirim et al.
[2020] investigated a number of stylised facts relating to the effects of airline disasters on aviation
stocks, where results indicate a substantially elevated levels of share price volatility in the aftermath
of aviation disasters. Share price volatility appeared to be significantly influenced by the scale of
the disaster in terms of the fatalities generated, with evidence suggesting the existence of significant
contagion and information flow effects upon the broad aviation sector. Ho et al. [2013] examined
the impact of aviation tragedies on the stock prices of the airlines that had encountered a crash
together with their rival carriers and found that the afflicted airline experienced deeper negative
abnormal returns as the degree of fatality increases. Investigative prognosis by Rose [1990] found
that accidents can also have an impact on insurance premiums for airlines. However the financial
impacts from the viewpoint of engine manufactures as a result of an accident has not been studied to
date. The global engine market is sizeable as the (widebody, narrowbody, regional jets and bizjets)
market was worth an estimated $70 billion in 2018 and is expected to be worth almost $1 trillion
1ICAO (2018). Safety report, 999 Boulevard Robert-Bourassa Montreal, QC, Canada H3C 5H7. Available here
2IATA (2019). More Connectivity and Improved Efficiency - 2018 Airline Industry Statistics Released, July 31.
Available here
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when including sales between 2014 and 2023 according to a Rolls-Royce global engine forecast.3,4,5
Therefore, the focus of this research is on this essential linchpin in the aviation value chain in
the form of airline engine manufacturers. While social media speculation lingers in the aftermath of
an aviation accident, it often encapsulates to scan the wider picture by spreading to all aspects of
the commercial operation including engine failure, which triggers a whole set of new interpretations
as to what transpired. Engine manufacturers must assert their moral obligation of producing a safe
product that is paramount to the commercial success of an aircraft in an industry that is renowned
with competitive pressures through cost, efficiency and regulation (Zhang and Gimeno [2016]).
While speculation mounts about the cause of the aviation incident, it is very possible that the
powerplants were not the cause, however, the engine manufacturers share price could theoretically
decline due to combined reputational interlinkages. The research also considers that the engines
were responsible for the cause of the accident, and that the engine manufacturer would most likely
be held to account, justifying a substantially elevated negative share price response for the engine
manufacturer when compared to the airline. But in two independently competitive industries, the
reputational damage could be enough to trigger irreparable financial and reputational damage. Such
an example was observed in the recent duel loss of MH17 and MH370 which led to the nationalisation
of Malaysia Airlines (Corbet et al. [2020]).
This research sets out to answer a number of key questions. First, a thorough analysis of all
aviation disasters was conducted through an international database to identify the key statistics
associated. The study then focused on the financial stock market interactions between the aircraft
companies and their selected engine manufacturer that considered the cumulative abnormal returns
after an accident when compared to the market index over a specific time period. Such interactions
are then analysed in detail to understand as to whether there exists variation by type of engine and
by type of airframe manufacturer, while the volatility of the stock returns is also measured. Finally,
a number of robust tests are applied to validate the results.
The results provide a variety of outcomes based on the varying behaviour and interactions
between aviation companies in periods of crises. First, when analysing the effects of airline disasters
on engine manufacturer’s profitability and financing structure, the associated findings reveal that the
net income falls sharply in the months following a major aviation disaster that involves an aircraft
that utilises an engine created by one of the engine manufacturers in our sample. Further, there is
evidence of a dampening effect on financial leverage of the company. These results are found to be
robust across a variety of methodological structures, indicating that engine manufacturers have to
contend with substantial income and financial leverage issues in the aftermath of a major aviation
disaster, irrespective of whether they have been identified as a causation factor in the incident
3BusinessWire (2018). Global $118 Billion Aircraft Engines Market Forecast Report 2017-2018 to 2026, June 25.
Available here
4Bank of America Merrill Lynch (2015). Power On - Commercial aerospace engine primer, Equity research report,
9th June.
5Bloomberg (2019). Aircraft Engine Market Size worth USD 97.12 Billion by 2026; Presence of Big Giants in the
Aviation Industry to Foster Growth, December 11. Available here
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itself. The second stage of the research focuses on the calculation of cumulative abnormal returns
that exist for engine manufacturers in the period after an aviation disaster, where we identify that
there exists a sharp one day loss of 1.64% in the aftermath of aviation incidents, and is found to
gradually extend such poor performance in each of the following analysed periods thereafter. In the
six months thereafter, the calculated CARs of the engine manufacturers of these airlines are found to
have under-performed the market index by over 6.5%. In the third stage of the analysis, the changes
in stock market volatility are analysed as a result of these disasters. Companies such as General
Electric, Rolls Royce, Textron and United Technology Corporation are found to exhibit quite a
substantial increase in share price volatility during the period immediately following an aircraft
incident that included aircraft using their components. The authors conclude the research by
focusing on the interaction between the returns of the engine manufacturers and the aviation sector
in the aftermath of the aviation disasters. When focusing on the inherent contagion effects of these
incidents, there is evidence to suggest that the largest events relating to companies such as General
Electric, Rolls Royce and United Technology Corporation, all of which possess significant links
with Airbus and Boeing, are collectively found to possess gradually elevated dynamic correlations
with the aviation sector in the sixty day period after such aviation disaster. This suggests that
the immediate price volatility particularly targets the designated engine manufacturer as news and
speculation develops and spreads about the related tragedy. However, over a brief period of time,
there is evidence to suggest that contagion effects take hold as speculation diminishes and more
factual evidence arrives.
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a thorough review of the literature relating
to the interlinkage between aviation disasters and airline engine manufacturers. Section 3 presents a
concise overview of the data used in this research along with the various methodologies employed to
capture firm-level volatility, both intra-sectoral and geographic volatility transmission, and indeed
contagion effects by type of aviation incident. Section 4 presents a concise overview of the results
presented, while Section 5 concludes.
2. Previous Literature
Fuel is an airlines highest cost item representing 23.5% of the total operating costs, whose
expenditure amounted to $180 billion for the industry in 2018. Although substantial, these numbers
are in fact already much lower than the historical highs in 2013 (33% and $231 billion). The wafer
thin margins of the airline industry were evident throughout 2018 as it generated just $6.12 profit
per passenger, indicating the importance of efficiency and cost containment of each element of
operating an aircraft and particularly that of engine fuel burn as reducing fuel consumption is a
unifying goal across the aviation industry.6 Engine technology is continuously improving as Hu
et al. [2018] found that the average fuel burn of new aircraft fell approximately 45%, or a compound
6Pearce, B. (2019). Airline industry outlook update, IATA Annual General Forecast, Seoul, 1-3 June. Available
here
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annual reduction rate of 1.3% between 1986 and 2014. The linkages between fuel (or, more generally,
operating costs) and an airline profitability have been touched upon through a variety of papers,
including Kang and Hansen [2018]; Heshmati and Kim [2016b]; Heshmati and Kim [2016a]; Kwan
and Rutherford [2015]; De Poret et al. [2015]; Zou et al. [2014]; Morrell [2011] and Swan and Adler
[2006]. The Industry has two key manufacturers of large engines, General Electric and Rolls Royce,
while three key manufacturers reside in the narrowbody or regional jet market, notably General
Electric, Safran and Pratt & Whitney. These power-plants equip the seven original equipment
manufacturers in these segments (Airbus, Boeing, Bombardier, Embraer, Mitsubishi, COMAC and
Sukhoi). The developmental cost of a new Jet engine is sizeable, costing between $1 and $2 billion,
while a similar amount is required for plant capital and sales concessions, creating high barriers
to industry. Product life cycles tend to be long, at 25 to 35 years in duration, with a stream of
services or spares revenues attached to each new engine worth 3 to 5 times of its value. These
initial power-plants are typically sold at less than unit manufacturing costs while cash flow remains
negative for 10 to 15 years (Epstein [2014]).
Much of the literature encapsulating the economics of airline operations bundles the following
entities as one unit of aircraft performance: the airframe type including its aerodynamic envelope;
maximum takeoff weight; engine performance; as the overall entity that determines fuel burn, which
epitomises its technical cost efficiency. Studies have traditionally sought to establish how technical
efficiency and productivity have evolved over time (Good et al. [1995]; Oum and Yu [1995]). Other
studies investigate airline cost efficiency (Oum and Zhang [1991]; Oum and Yu [1998]) or both pro-
ductivity and cost competitiveness (Oum and Yu [2012]; Windle and Dresner [1992]; Windle [1991]).
The literature dedicated to the analysis of airline financial performance focuses on efficiency and
airline productivity (Schefczyk [1993]; Gittell et al. [2004]; Tsikriktsis [2007]; Barros and Peypoch
[2009]). The literature is replete with references to airline safety. Airline accidents represent a
perilous impass for the involved party, as they have a significant impact on the demand for air
travel, which ultimately affects the finances of an airline, compounding its share price volatility.
Borenstein and Zimmerman [1988] estimated that the loss in enplanement as a result of a crash
accrued to about 10-15% of one months worth of traffic. A majority of extant studies on the effect
of profitability on safety takes place in the transportation industries. For example, Golbe [1983]
examined the connection between profitability and safety in the US railroad industry and found a
positive association between contemporaneous profitability and safety - such that railroads are more
profitable when they are involved in fewer accidents. However, Golbe [1986] subsequent analysis of
the pre-deregulation US airline industry finds no significant relationship between airline profitabil-
ity and contemporaneous safety. Rose [1990] revisits the profit-safety link for US airlines, finding
a marginally significant positive relationship between airline profitability and safety for all airlines
and a stronger positive relationship for smaller airlines. Rose improves on the methods employed by
Golbe [1983] and Golbe [1986] by utilising lagged profitability measures, eliminating the possibility
of reverse causality whereby the observed relationship between profitability and safety is driven by
the effect of an accident on its profitability rather than the effects of profitability on safety processes.
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Raghavan and Rhoades [2005] concurs with the findings of Rose. Both Borenstein and Zimmerman
[1988] together with Mitchell and Maloney [1989] analysed changes in equity value following acci-
dents and found evidence that airlines that experienced fatal accidents were subsequently penalised
by modest profitability declines. Subsequently, the literature on airline safety is highly influenced
by event studies assessing the impact of crashes on stock market prices (see for example Bosch
et al. [1998], Borenstein and Zimmerman [1988], Chalk [1986]; Chalk [1987]; Mitchell and Maloney
[1989]).
The selected hypotheses and methodologies for this investigation are built on a number of
disciplines and avenues of research. While considering the interactions between aviation companies,
one must consider other types of assets and events that could potentially influence the selected
companies and selected methodologies. Stock market volatility because of a shock, structural change
or change in conditions can significantly impact the share price of a company and a number of papers
have studied this concept. Yun and Yoon [2019] found that there is a return and volatility spillover
effect between crude oil price and the stock prices of airlines and that the stock prices of smaller
airlines of South Korea and China are relatively more sensitive to the change in oil price. Carvalho
et al. [2011] analysed the 2008 case where an six-year old article based on the bankruptcy of United
Airline’s parent company was mistakenly identified as a new bankruptcy filing, causing a 76% fall in
the company’s share price, but after the case was identified as an error, the stock remained over 11%
below opening prices, as the authors identify that contagion effects would dominate competitive
effects. Luo [2007] used longitudinal real-world data set that matches consumer negative voice
(complaint records) in the airline industry with firm stock prices, this article finds that higher levels
of current consumer negative voice harm firms’ future idiosyncratic stock returns. Guzhva et al.
[2010] assess the market valuation of airline convertible preferred stocks to suggest that airlines
undervalue by approximately 10% when they raise capital by issuing convertible securities. Hung
and Liu [2005] use the beta value, an indicator of systematic risk, to estimate the costs of equity
and the evaluation of a stock’s reasonable price, to find that airline betas are volatile over time and
that crashes and stock market trends may also impact them.
A number of previous pieces of research focused on the measurement of share price volatility
effects outside of the aviation industry. Such research develops on the work of French et al. [1987]
who examined the relation between stock returns and stock market volatility to find evidence that
the expected market risk premium (the expected return on a stock portfolio minus the Treasury
bill yield) is positively related to the predictable volatility of stock returns. While Schwert [1989]
found stock market volatility changed over time, while Campbell and Hentschel [1992] developed
a formal model of this volatility feedback effect using a simple model of changing variance to
find that volatility feedback normally has little effect on returns, but it can be important during
periods of high volatility. Marais and Bates [2006] and Sander and Kleimeier [2003] focused on
the contagion effects of the Asian financial crisis of the late-1990s, while Arghyrou and Kontonikas
[2012], Kenourgios et al. [2011], Samarakoon [2011], Samitas and Tsakalos [2013] and Philippas and
Siriopoulos [2013] focused on the contagion effects from both the US and European elements of the
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subprime and European financial crises. Koutmos and Booth [1995] and Ramchand and Susmel
[1998] identified that volatility spillovers in a given market are much more pronounced when the
news arriving from the last market to trade is bad, while the correlations between the US and other
world markets are on average 2 to 3.5 times higher when the US market is in a high variance state as
compared to a low variance regime. Veronesi [1999] found that in equilibrium, investors’ willingness
to hedge against changes in their own ‘uncertainty’ on the true state makes stock prices overreact to
bad news in good times and under-react to good news in bad times. Bekaert and Wu [2000] found
evidence of volatility feedback when investigating the market portfolio and portfolios with different
leverage constructed from Nikkei 225 stocks. Andrei and Hasler [2015] investigated the joint role
played by investors’ attention to news and learning uncertainty in determining asset prices, both
theoretically and empirically showing that both attention and uncertainty are key determinants of
asset prices.
Focusing on the use of methodologies to specifically analyse the contagion effects of such airline
disasters and the interactions between the airlines and the engine manufacturers, the authors of
this paper developed a preferred analysis while considering a number of previous works. Forbes
and Rigobon [2002] were amongst the first to tests for contagion based on correlation coefficients
which they defined as a significant increase in market comovement after a shock to one country.
Such correlation coefficients were found to be conditional on market volatility, where the authors
identify a high level of market comovement during periods of crisis. Bae et al. [2003] based their
measure of contagion by capturing the coincidence of extreme return shocks across countries within
a region and across regions find that contagion is predictable and depends on regional interest rates,
exchange rate changes, and conditional stock return volatility in emerging markets during the 1990s.
Such contagion was found not just to be identified in stock markets. Longstaff [2010] identified
contagion effects in markets for subprime asset-backed collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and
their contagion effects on other markets, while Sadorsky [2012] found evidence of correlations and
volatility spillovers between oil prices and the stock prices of clean energy companies. Swidan and
Merkert [2019] investigated the relative effect of operational hedging on airline operating costs, pre-
senting evidence of reduced operating costs, but also providing the caveat that such decision-making
does not, in isolation, oprovide an optimal strategy to manage jet fuel risk exposure. Berghöfer and
Lucey [2014] studied the extent of operational and fuel hedging in airlines, identifying that neither
financial nor operational hedging is effective and that fleet diversity matters greatly. Corbet et al.
[2020] investigated the effects of negative WTI on hedging and portfolio dynamics. Hsu et al. [2008]
proposed a class of new copula-based GARCH models for the estimation of the optimal hedge ra-
tio and compare their effectiveness with that of other hedging models, including the conventional
static, the constant conditional correlation (CCC) GARCH and DCC-GARCH to find performance
improvements in comparison to other dynamic hedging models. El Hedi Arouri et al. [2011] used
a generalised VAR-GARCH approach to examine the extent of volatility transmission between oil
and stock markets in Europe and the United States at the sector-level to identify the existence of
significant volatility spillover between oil and sector stock returns.
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3. Data and Methodology
3.1. Data
The analysis initiated by constructing a concise list of airline disasters that can then be utilised in
a thorough and robust methodological investigation with engine manufacturers corporate accounts
and stock market performance. The authors establish as to whether there exist specific speculative
financial punishment for engine manufacturers in the aftermath of an airline disaster. As earlier
hypothesised, broad speculation based on the cause of such an airline disaster can manifest through
many forms, but direct financial punishment due to investor perceptions can present a number of
damaging side-effects for the broad aviation sector. To develop such a dataset, a number of strict
rules are developed in an attempt to standardise the process across major international financial
markets. The first implemented rule is that the specified company must be a publicly traded
company with an available stock ticker between the period June 1, 1995 and May 31, 2019. This
specific time period is identified due to the relative absence of concise financial market in the period
before.
There are two specific methodological approaches developed within this research. Firstly, an
investigative approach is instigated to determine if there exists a direct effect within the company
as measured by its internal financial performance across a number of theoretically supported, robust
methodologies, while also considering the manner in which the financial performance of the engine
manufacturers change. Secondly, there is a focus on the financial performance and investor percep-
tions of the events through a thorough analysis of share price volatility of the same manufacturers,
along with a thorough analysis of the contagion effects of such volatility as sourced from the airline
industry upon the manufacturers of aviation engine technologies. The selected corporate account
data is taken from Bloomberg. Stock price data is taken from Thomson Reuters Eikon. The second
news selection rule is based on the source of the data. The authors develop on a combined search
of LexisNexis, Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters Eikon, search for the keywords relating to avia-
tion disasters. For added robustness of the developed dataset, the authors leverage upon that of
the National Transportation Safety Board (available at: https://www.ntsb.gov), the International
Civil Aviation Organisation, ICAO (available at: https://www.icao.int) and the Aviation Safety
Reporting System (available at: https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov). To obtain a viable observation, a single
observation must be present across each of the selected search engines and the source was denoted
as an international news agency, a mainstream domestic news agency or the company making the
announcement itself. Forums, social media and bespoke news websites were omitted from the search.
Finally, the selected observation is based solely on the confirmed news announcements being made
on the same day across all of the selected sources. If a confirmed article or news release had a varying
date of release, it was omitted due to this associated ambiguity. All observations found to be made
on either a Saturday or Sunday are denoted as active on the following Monday morning. All times
are adjusted to GMT, with the official end of day closing price treated as the listed observation for
each comparable company when analysing associated contagion effects.
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The associated summary statistics for the selected engine and engine component manufacturers
are presented in Table 1. Three control variables have been selected to act as a representation of
international effects. The Dow Jones International Average (DJIA) is used to control for financial
market performance during the period under investigation. While considering a number of inter-
national airlines and engines manufacturers, the study also accounts for financial growth and crises
during the period. This is further accounted for through the use of West Texas Intermediate (WTI)
oil prices and the S&P500 Aviation Index. The aviation sector is found to present the largest mean
returns during the period between 1995 and 2019. WTI is found to possess the largest standard
deviation of returns (0.0231) of the selected independent variables along with the two most extreme
one-day price increase and decrease of 17.83% and 15.25% respectively. The aviation index is found
to be the most negatively skewed (-0.1486) and also possess the largest level of kurtosis (9.1538).
While focusing on the examined engine manufacturers, there are a number of particularly significant
events and results. The largest mean return is exhibited by MTU Aero Engines (+0.0008), while
Textron exhibits the largest standard deviation with regards to the selected companies (+0.0241).
The largest one-day fall in the share price of an engine manufacturer was experienced by that of
Safran (-33.3%), closely followed by that of Textron (-31.6%). The largest one-day price increase
was experienced by Textron (+48.9%), presenting evidence of the particularly volatility behaviour
of this share price. The second largest one-day share price increase was experienced by Honeywell
International (+26.2%). The most negatively skewed company returns are that of BAE Systems
(-0.6965), while the most positively skewed are that of Textron (+0.5876). Textron also possesses
the largest kurtosis of any of the selected engine manufacturers (+42.38), while Leonardo SpA
experienced the lowest kurtosis of returns (+6.07)
Insert Table 1 about here
Figure 1 outlines the geographical dispersion of the identified accidents while both Table 2
and Figure 2 make reference to the number of fatalities by year of the same accidents. Some
Countries stand out such as Brazil, the United States, Russia, China, Nigeria and Indonesia as
they were amongst the worst hit in terms of domiciled companies that were attributed to the
cause of such aviation disasters. There appears to be no discernible pattern in the number of total
fatalities between 1995 and 2018. The largest number accidents including fatalities occurred in 1996
where 1,339 people died in fifty major airline disasters related to publicly traded companies. This
included the largest aviation disaster in the sample where 312 persons perished when a Boeing 747-
100 belonging to Saudi Arabian Airlines crashed in New Delhi. Overall, 12,692 fatalities occurred
across 610 accidents during the period analysed.
Insert Figure 2 and Table 2 about here
Table 3 shows the number of incidents on a company-by-company basis. Three substantial
outliers are identified within the group of publicly traded companies. American Airlines has eight
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individual accidents that account for 588 fatalities. The eight American Airlines disasters occur
between December 1995 and December 2005. The largest incident occurred on 12 November 2001,
one month after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, when 262 people perished in another catastrophe in
New York. Boeing directly supplied the aircraft in seven of the eight incidents, while the other
aircraft type was a McDonnell Douglas MD-82. Next, Malaysia Airlines experienced two substantial
incidents that led to the loss of 537 persons. These incidents refer to the loss of MH17 and MH370,
where the former was lost after being stuck by a missile in the Ukraine, while the latter has yet
to be found despite going missing in 2014. Both of these incidents occurred within five months of
each other and in both cases a Boeing 777-200 was lost. Finally, China Airlines experienced 428
fatalities in three separate incidents. The first referred to the loss of an Airbus A300-600 in 1998 in
Taipai resulting in 203 fatalities. The second case referred to the loss of 225 persons in Taiwan in
2002 during the loss of a Boeing 747-200, while the final case referred to a serious incident involving
a Boeing 737-800 in February 2007.
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here
Considering that the market for airline travel is an extremely competitive industry, any broad
error of substantial loss of credibility and reputation can lead to quite a disastrous financial outcome.
Table 4, represents a list of airlines that are no longer in operation today, in the aftermath of a
substantial aviation disaster. It is also quite important to note that there are also a number of
such companies that have actually experienced multiple events. Adamair is found to have had
three substantial events leading to the lost of 102 passengers. Prior to the crash of Adamair Flight
574, it was the fastest growing low-cost carrier in Indonesia. On March 16, 2007, the Indonesian
government grounded the carrier as it was deemed mismanaged which was further compounded by
embezzlement proceedings. Hewa Bora Airways also experienced three separate incidents before
operations were suspended after flight 952 crashed in 2011. This carrier had undergone a series
of mergers and management changes (FlyCongo, Compagnie Africaine d’Aviation, Zaire Airlines,
and Congo Airlines). The third company that experienced three incidents that forced its grounding
was that of Rico Linhas Aereas S/A, which was a Brazilian regional airline authorised to operate
scheduled passenger and cargo services in the Amazon region. Table 5, details the summary statistics
of the crashes that led to fatalities based on the cohort of aircraft type that crashed. In terms of
frequency, the three most frequently involved aircraft with engines developed by publicly traded
engine manufacturers were the De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter, the Boeing 737-200, the Cessna
208 Caravan, and the Britten-Norman Islander. In terms of fatalities, the larger planes such as the
Boeing 727-200, Boeing 737-200, Boeing 737-800, Boeing 747-100, Boeing 777-200, Airbus A320,
Airbus A300-600, Airbus A310 and McDonnell Douglas MD-83 resulted in the most severe crashes.
Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here
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Table 6, denotes the summary statistics for each major crash associated by engine manufacturer
that was attached to downed airliner. United Technologies Corporation and Rolls Royce are found
to be the leading engine manufacturer for 160 and 157 of the identified accidents respectively,
obtained during the analysis. Furthermore, General Electric provide leading engines for use in the
CF6 engine-series which were mounted on the wings of Airbus A300, A310, A330, B747 and B767,
while the GE90 series are used in B777 and the next generation of engines, termed the GEnx series
are fitted on the Boeing 787 and 747-8i, which collectively accounted for 30 significant accidents that
resulted in the deaths of 1,269 passengers. Pratt & Whitney’s main engines (United Technologies
Corporation is the associated parent company) include the JT8D series which were the powerplants
for early Boeing 737s, the JT9D series were attached to Airbus A300, A310, Boeing 767, 747, the
PW2000 series thrusted the Boeing 757, while the PW4000 series were used in Airbus A300, A310
and A330 as well as the Boeing 767, 747 and 777, while the smaller PW6000 series powered the
Airbus A318. Meanwhile Rolls-Royce produced the RB200 series engine which was used in Boeing
747 and 757, the Trent 500 series was used in later Airbus A340, the Trent 700 series powered the
Airbus A330, while the Trent 800 series were used in Boeing 777, the Trent 970 series was attached
to the Airbus A350 and A380, while the newer Trent 1000 series is used in Boeing 787s.
Between these three companies, there has also been a number of joint-venture collaborations that
have been at the forefront of engine manufacturing development. Firstly, the CFM International
joint venture between General Electric and Safran colluded to produce the CFM56 series widely used
in Airbus A318/A319/A320/A321, early A340, and later Boeing 737s. Secondly, the Engine Alliance
was a joint venture between General Electric and Pratt & Whitney which produced the GP7000
series that is used for the Airbus A380. Finally, one of the largest Joint ventures was based on that
of International Aero Engines, who formed a consortium that encompassed Pratt & Whitney, Rolls-
Royce, Japanese Aero Engine Corporation and MTU. This engine was used in the IAE V2500 series
and powered the Airbus A319/A320/A321. Other significant engine component manufacturers that
experienced severe aviation disasters were that of BAE systems, Lockheed Martin and Textron.
3.2. Methodology
While it is of course expected that the airline that has been directly affected by a major disaster
would have substantial financial ramifications, both in terms of immediate internal monetary damage
through loss of earnings through reduced passenger flows and by the exceptional costs associated
thereafter, without any direct evidence of potential causality, the engine manufacturers would be
expected to be somewhat buffered from such attributed responsibility. Any evidence of a substantial
financial shock to engine manufacturers without firm evidence provided would be considered to be
generated by highly speculative investor behaviour. This very situation could potentially generate
broad financial repercussions for the aviation sector at large through increased costs, regulatory
misalignment and increased exposure to external shocks due to excessive competitive pressures.
There are several ways through which the unfortunate aviation disaster experienced by a company
could have an impact on that company’s financial variables, both on the book-value, and more
immediately in the financial markets. In particular, perceptions of reduced future sectoral growth
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by the airline sector would manifest in quite a negative outlook for the engine manufacturers,
which would be subsequently reflected through decreased profitability and leverage on the financial
statements of the company. Moreover, due to the substantial negative publicity and perceptions
of wrong-doing, which could possibly be present without due cause, the company’s share price
might experience dramatic decreases in the short through medium term. This could be expected to
manifest in sharp increases in stock market volatility and interactions with other market variables
through the spread of financial market contagion. Contagion effects are also considered as this
can be the source of inter-sectoral risk transfer between the aviation sector and that of engine
manufacturers. All these arguments will be analysed thoroughly in the rest of the paper using the
following methodologies.
3.2.1. The impact of aviation disasters on firms’ profitability and financing structure
In this part of the analysis, the authors aim to investigate as to whether engine manufacturer’s
next term profitability has directly been influenced by aviation disasters. Furthermore an exami-
nation seeks to determine if the firms have had to manipulate their use of financial leverage so as
they can mitigate such financial difficulties. Both of these scenarios are investigated with emphasis
on the fact that the engine manufacturer has not been held responsible in any way for the related
airline disaster with the exception that they had supplied the downed airline with its engines and
is perceived by investors to be potentially responsible. The motivation for these hypotheses comes
from the fact that the company is potentially about to enter a highly speculative and sensitive
period of time where blame could indeed be attributed. Therefore, profitability of the company
might fall substantially and its access to debt financing might become substantially more difficult
to obtain as lenders observe substantially elevated levels of risk. To work on the above mentioned
hypotheses, quarterly balance sheet and income statement data are used for the period between
Q3 of 1995 and Q2 of 2019, adding up to twenty-eight quarters in total. All data comes from
Thomson Reuters Datastream. FLt represent financial leverage calculated by company’s debt to
equity at the end of quarter t and NIt represents the net income in quarter t. Control variables are
constructed subject to three sets of stock characteristics. All variables are updated every quarter
unless otherwise stated.
The first set is associated with historical return patterns; (i) Size: Natural logarithm of the
firm’s market capitalisation by the end of last quarter, (ii) Book to Market (B/M) Ratio: Book-to-
market ratio by the end of last quarter, (iii) MOM−1Q: Cumulative return over the last quarter,
(iv) MOM[−4Q,−1Q]: Cumulative three quarters’ return preceding the last quarter, and (v) Beta:
Beta obtained from the regression of the firm’s monthly returns over the last 2 years on the monthly
market returns over the same period; i.e., ri− rf = α+β(rM − rf ) + ε. The second set is associated
with liquidity and transaction costs; (vi) Price: Natural logarithm of the stock price by the end
of each quarter, (vii) Turnover (TRN): Turnover ratio over the last quarter, and (viii) Amihud:
Amihud ratio over the last quarter. Finally, the third set of stock characteristics is associated
with prudence; (ix) Age: Natural logarithm of the number of quarters that the company is listed
on the exchange, (x) Dividend Yield (DY): Dividend yield over the last quarter, (xi) Index: A
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dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is included in the benchmark index and 0 otherwise, and (xii)
Volatility (VOL): Standard deviation of monthly returns in the last 2 years. Therefore, 12 stock
characteristics are used as control variables in total.
To examine the effects of such incidents on a company’s profitability (H1) and financial leverage
(H2), the authors run the following panel regressions in equation (1) through equation (3) using
two-way clustered standard errors:
Yt+1 = α+ β1Histt + γIncidentt + εt (1)
Yt+1 = α+ β2Liqt + γIncidentt + εt (2)
Yt+1 = α+ β3Prudt + γIncidentt + εt (3)
In this model, Y is either the NI or FL and Xt is the vector of 12 stock characteristics described
above, as separated as β1Histt for the group relating to historical return patterns, β2Liqt which
represents the variables analysing liquidity and transaction costs, and β3Prudt which analyses
corporate prudence. On the other hand, Incidentt is i) a dummy variable taking the value unity
in the period after the accident in quarter t. In each of the twenty-eight quarters, the authors
winsorize all variables at the level of 95% (both dependent and independent) with the exception of
the index and incident dummies in the cross-section by two levels from both upper and lower tails
to eliminate the outlier effect without removing any observations.
3.3. Does there exist an engine manufacturer share price discount due to aviation disasters?
The analysis is elongated by conducting a thorough investigation of the cumulative abnormal
returns for each company and the average cumulative abnormal returns in the aftermath of a airline
incident leading to injury or fatality. Abnormal returns are calculated as the companies’ returns
less that of the exchange on which the company trades (as used by Akyildirim et al. [2020], Corbet
and Gurdgiev [2019] and Corbet et al. [2020]). The analysis is partitioned by each publicly traded
company that provided engines to the airlines of interest. It is also of interest to examine as to
whether there exists persistence of any identified share price discounts in such circumstances. We
select a variety of time-frames on which to analyse such effects. The authors investigate the 1-,
5- 10-, 20-, 30-, 60-, 90- and 180-day periods after each identified events to identify as to whether
such engine manufacturer share price discounts persist while the investigation into the cause of the
airline disaster takes place, or indeed, as to whether such effects are found to dissipate within this
time-frame. Evidence of such a share price discount is particularly damaging across a number of
areas. First, it must be noted that engine manufacturers are heavily reliant on external financing
while researching and developing future engine technology. The impact of such financial pressures
and reputational damage in the aftermath of such airline incidents can greatly reduce the availability
of such financing. Further, the existence of such a share price discount would also strongly indicate
that engine manufacturers have been greatly influenced by speculative investors, who are most
likely attempting to invest on ‘potential‘ developing stories rather than on a factual basis. Such
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speculative investment is by no means illegal, but it has been dealt with in a variety of manners over
time, such as the implementation of ‘short-sale bans‘ on banking shares during the most stressful
and volatile periods of the most recent international financial crisis.
3.3.1. The volatility effects of aviation disasters within the sector for engine manufacturers
GARCH-based methodologies are found to be one of the primary mechanisms through which one
can observe direct volatility effects in financial markets, allowing for both comparison and scalability
of parameters. Developing from key analyses that focused on issues such as the GARCH(1,1)
quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (Lee and Hansen [1994]) and the consistency and asymptotic
normality of such models (Lumsdaine [1996]), Tse and Tsui [2002] were the first to propose a
multivariate generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (MGARCH) model with time-
varying correlations which retained the intuition and interpretation of the univariate GARCH model
and yet satisfies the positive-definite condition as found in the constant-correlation and Baba-Engle-
Kraft-Kroner models. Garcia et al. [2005] provided estimations of GARCH to act in a forecasting
ability to predict day-ahead electricity prices. Hansen and Lunde [2005] compared 330 ARCH-type
models in terms of their ability to describe the conditional variance to find no evidence that a
GARCH(1,1) is outperformed by more sophisticated models in their analysis of exchange rates.
Whereas the GARCH(1,1) is clearly inferior to models that can accommodate a leverage effect in
their analysis of IBM returns. Kristjanpoller and Concha [2016] found a strong positive influence
of fuel price fluctuation and airline stock returns using GARCH-family methodologies. Corbet
et al. [2019] found that airline traffic flows fall quite sharply despite significant fare reductions as
a result of terrorist incidents in Europe using a seasonally-adjusted ARMA-GARCH methodology.
Such terrorism impacts were also found to be both significant and substantial when considering the
persistence of their effects at both sectoral and national levels (Kolaric and Schiereck [2016]; Carter
and Simkins [2004]; Kim and Gu [2004]; Corbet et al. [2018]).
In this analysis, we undertake specific investigation is undertaken to determine if there exists a
substantial change in stock price volatility of the engine manufacturers due to their direct association
with the airline company that has experienced a severe accident. Analysis is conducted to decipher if
the associated volatility in the periods both before and after the designated announcement of a crash
presents evidence of substantial change. Firstly, statistical tests are applied to determine if there is
an increase in unconditional variance of the company stocks’ daily returns (and the corresponding
excess returns over the market they are traded in) after announcements for various time periods
by utilising a common variance inequality test. Secondly, more penetrative scrutiny is enforced by
building upon the GARCH-family to understand the volatility dynamics of crypto-exuberance based
on naming behaviour in the conditional variances. At this stage, a number of goodness-of-fit testing
procedures identified the EGARCH(1,1) model as the best selected to identify specific volatility
changes in the companies’ returns, thus we exercise our analysis using this model.7 The variance
7EGARCH exploits information contained in realised measures of volatility while providing a flexible leverage
function that accounts for return-volatility dependence. While remaining in a GARCH-like modelling framework
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equation of our EGARCH model is expressed as follows:
ln(h2t ) = ω + αεt−1 + γ(|εt−1|−E(|εt−1|)) + β ln(h2t−1) +Dt (4)
Here, an additional Dt term is included in equation (4) in the analysis to provide a coefficient
relating to the observed volatility in the subsequent days following each event for each of the inves-
tigated companies. Before proceeding with the EGARCH analysis, exogenous effects are migrated
which can be completed through the inclusion of the returns of traditional financial products in the
mean equation of the EGARCH(1,1) methodology as displayed in equation (5).
Rt = a0 + b1Rt−1 + b2DJIAt + b3WTIt + b4AV It + εt (5)
The volatility sourced in shocks that are incorporated in the returns of traditional financial mar-
kets are therefore considered in the volatility estimation of the selected structure. In equation (5),
Rt−1 represents the lagged value of the observed company returns. DJIAt is the returns of the
benchmark index where the stock is traded, and represents the interaction between the selected
company returns and the corresponding market index. WTIt represents the interactions between
the selected company and the market for West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil. Such interactions are
very much of interest from a methodological standpoint due to the observed interactions between
the market for oil and international crisis and instability. Therefore, the selection of WTI in this
methodological structure allows the GARCH-family methodologies to incorporate and account for
such instability. Similarly, the addition of the variable AV It incorporates broad trends and periods
of instability within the broad aviation sector.
3.3.2. Analysing potential contagion effects: A DCC-EGARCH methodology
The final stage of our selected analysis develops on the channels through which such airline
sector volatility influences that of the engine manufacturers in the periods after such incidents.
While no particular causality has been identified throughout a number of the selected cases in our
above analysis, it is very much of interest in this section to identify and observe as to whether
engine manufacturers are found to experience direct contagion flows from the airline industry, and
indeed, as to how long these particular periods of contagion persist. It is important to identify as
to whether companies who had traditionally little or no direct involvement with such incidents had
observed structural changes in their previously outstanding interactions. For example, a company
who had changed their name from that which did not identify as a blockchain or cryptocurrency-
related company to one that does thereafter, could therefore theoretically experience a sharp change
and estimation convenience, the model allows independent return and volatility shock and this dual shock nature
leaves a room for the establishment of a variance risk premium. In our selection, other competitive models included
EGARCH, TGARCH, Asymmetric Power ARCH (APARCH), Component GARCH (CGARCH) and the Asymmetric
Component GARCH (ACGARCH). The optimal model is chosen according to three information criteria, namely the
Akaike (AIC), Bayesian (BIC) and Hannan-Quinn (HQ).
15
in dynamic correlations, perhaps also indicative that the company is being treated differently by
investors in the aftermath of changed perceptions of corporate risk-tolerance (Corbet et al. [2020]).
For example, it is important to specifically analyse if these investors, who could perceive that
these companies have changed in terms of their perceived high-risk behaviour. To consider the
contagion effects, the popular dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model of Engle [2002] is
applied. The authors firstly let rt = [r1,t, ..., rn,t]′ be the vector of financial time series returns and
εt = [ε1,t, ..., εn,t]
′ be the vector of return residuals obtained after some filtration. Let hi,t be the
corresponding conditional volatilities obtained from a univariate EGARCH process.
Assume that Et−1[εt] = 0 and Et−1[εtε′t] = Ht, where Et[·] is the conditional expectation on






where Rt = [ρij,t] is the asset conditional correlation matrix and the diagonal matrix of the asset
conditional variances is given by Dt = diag(h1,t, ..., hn,t). Engle [2002] models the right hand side
of Eq.(6) rather than Ht directly and proposes the dynamic correlation structure
Rt = {Q∗t }−1/2Qt{Q∗t }−1/2,
Qt = (1− a− b)S + aut−1u′t−1 + bQt−1,
(7)
where Qt ≡ [qij,t], ut = [u1,t, ..., un,t]′ and ui,t is the transformed residuals i.e. ui,t = εi,t/hi,t,
S ≡ [sij ] = E[utu′t] is the n× n unconditional covariance matrix of ut, Q∗t = diag{Qt} and a, b are
non-negative scalars satisfying a+ b < 1. The parameters of the DCC model are estimated by using
the quasi-maximum likelihood method with respect to the log-likelihood function, and according to
the state two-step procedure.
4. Results
4.1. Impact of airline disasters on firms’ profitability and financing structure
The estimated coefficients are reported of equation (1) through equation (3) for the cases of net
income (NI) and financial leverage (FL) with respect to the influence of such aviation disasters on
the corporate accounts of engine manufacturers. For each of the explained variables, the authors
separately regress the selected control variables that represents i) historical return patterns (M1
column); ii) liquidity and transaction costs (M2 column), and iii) prudence (M3 column) as shown
in Table 7. Finally, the column representing Mall present the results when all control variables are
used for explanatory purposes.
Insert Table 7 about here
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In Table 7, it is noticeable that whether a sub-group of control variables is applied or all applied at
the same time, there is consistency in the signs of the explanatory variables with a few exceptions for
both net income and financial leverage analysis. This shows the reliability of the results. According
to theMall analysis, except the insignificant market cap and short-term momentum variables, effect
of all variables on profitability differ with respect to either sign or insignificance between the types
of incide. In this analysis, the main variable of interest is the dummy variable γ and according to
our findings, the coefficient of this dummy indicates that net income falls sharply in the aftermath
of the months following a major aviation disaster that involves an aircraft that utilises an engine
created by one of the engine manufacturers in our sample. Further, there is evidence of a dampening
effect on financial leverage of the company. This is quite an interesting result, as in the majority of
the cases sampled, there is no distinct evidence provided during this time period to indicate that
the engines on the aircraft were in fact responsible for the accident. Regarding the determinants of
financial leverage, both methodological structures present common factors. For example, according
to the Mall column, variables such as market cap, book-to-market ratio, short-term momentum,
beta, stock price, age and volatility have no significant impact on the leverage; whereas turnover
and Amihud ratio are both significant and have impact in the same direction.
4.1.1. Robustness tests based on profitability and financing structure results
To check the robustness of the finding above, the authors try alternative variations of equa-
tions (1) through (3) and start with estimating the following equations (8) through (10). The
motivation is to bring a dynamic perspective to the analysis by focusing on not the levels but the
change in the levels of net income and leverage.
∆Yt+1 = Yt+1 − Yt = α+ β1Histt + γIncidentt + εt (8)
∆Yt+1 = Yt+1 − Yt = α+ β2Liqt + γIncidentt + εt (9)
∆Yt+1 = Yt+1 − Yt = α+ β3Prudt + γIncidentt + εt (10)
The robustness analysis is taken to another level and instead of a separate analysis for the
combined financial effects, an analogous regression is employed of equations (1) through (3) and
(8) through (10) in the new equations (11) and (12), respectively. The results are presented in
Table 8. These models allow for control of the multiple types of financial effects at the same
time in the aftermath of the identified aviation disasters. Significant results would indicate that
there exist corporate financial effects on engine manufacturers without any evidence or allocation
of responsibility.
Insert Table 8 about here
At this stage, the authors solely focus on the main variable of interest and discuss the findings on
the main control variables for the accounts of the engine manufacturers. Accordingly, the findings
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strongly support our earlier presented results whether we use only a sub-group or all control variables
at the same time to explain the changes in the dependent variables of quarterly net income change
or leverage change. In both cases, γ remains significantly negative for each of the sub-models tests
as M1, M2 and M3 present results of -0.483, -0.481 and -0.442 for the change in net income and
-0.358, -0.357 and 0.334 for the change in financial leverage as shown in Table 8.
At this stage, to verify the existence of effects on the profitability and financial structure of
engine manufacturer companies, the expectations of the dummy coefficient signs in the last two
equations above are the same as in the previous analysis, and the findings almost perfectly fit. In
the case of equation (11), without an exception, all dummy coefficients are significantly negative for
both income and the leverage.
Yt+1 = α+ β1Histt + β2Liqt + β3Prudt + γIncidentt + εt (11)
∆Yt+1 = Yt+1 − Yt = α+ β1Histt + β2Liqt + β3Prudt + γIncidentt + εt (12)
Further verification is provided through the inclusion of equation 12 in Table 8 which provides the
full specification methodology using first-differenced net income and financial leverage data for the
analysed engine manufacturers, which, despite presenting results that are somewhat below the same
analysis results for net income and financial leverage (-0.711 and -0.455 respectively), pertaining to
the regression testing and when comparing this to the results of the robustness testing procedure, -
0.475 and -0.286 respectively, we find that both outcomes produce the same size and scale, providing
substantial support as to the selected methodological procedures used in this analysis. The findings
indicate that engine manufacturers have to content with substantial income and financial leverage
issues in the aftermath of a major aviation disaster, irrespective of whether they have been identified
as a causation factor in the incident itself.
4.2. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for engine manufacturers in the aftermath of airline
disasters
Next an attempt is formulated to establish how influential aviation disasters were upon the share
price performance of the analysed engine manufacturers. To examine this effect we calculate the
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) which are presented in Table 9. First focusing on the overall
average of CARs, we clearly identify that there exists a sharp one day loss of 1.64% in the aftermath
of aviation incidents. This result is largely driven by the sharp initial one-day fall in the price of
BAE Systems (-9.16%), Honeywell International (-2.84%) and Leonardo SpA (-2.38%). Substantial
corporate instability is found to persist without the company being in any way responsible for the
incident. Shortly thereafter, contagion effects increase as speculation diminishes and more factual
evidence arrives.
Insert Table 9 about here
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There is evidence of a sharp deterioration in the calculated CAR approximately ten days after
the event (-1.64%) and this excess loss over the market average continues up to one-hundred and
twenty-five days after the event where the calculated CAR is -8.14%. Only in the period thereafter
does the calculated CAR improve to approximately -5.4%, but in the subsequent three month period,
the market performance deteriorates further in comparison to the market average. One hundred
and eighty days after each of our analysed aviation disasters, the calculated CARs of the engine
manufacturers of these airlines are found to have under-performed the market index in excess of
5%. While a broad variety of results exist, there exist two companies that out-perform the market
index in the six months after the average of the incidents that are analysed.
Insert Figure 3 about here
A graphical representation of the daily estimate of the CARs for the overall sample is illustrated
in Figure 3. For the overall sample there are multiple distinct, yet sharp periods of deterioration in
the performance of the companies when compared to the market index, the first in the forty-five days
after the event which is found to result in a loss of 5% approximately. The share price performance
falls quite substantially once again between four and six months after the event leading to a point
in time estimated loss in excess of 8% when compared to the related domestic market index.
4.3. Firm-level volatility by type of airline disaster
The level of conditional volatility on a case-by-case basis is presented with significant results in
Table 10. With regards to specific companies, General Electric, Rolls Royce, Textron and United
Technology Corporation present evidence of the largest number of significant volatility events during
the period analysed. There is also an interesting observation to be made in the wide-ranging
reduction in the number of statistically significantly volatility events within the designated time
period under observation. It is apparent that while each company with the exception of Rockwell
Automation experience significant effects for a number of aviation disasters in an exceptionally short
time-frame (such as the day on which the news was announced), the effects appear to subside in the
weeks that follow, as evident in the reduced number of statistically significant volatility changes in
the periods throughout twenty, forty and sixty days after.
Insert Table 10 about here
One particularly interesting observation is made when considering these results based on the
dates on which the most significant observations have occurred. While considering that the sample
incorporated all events identified between June 1995 and May 2019, there are only eight signifi-
cantly positive conditional volatility increases in excess of +0.05 since January 2010. This is of
particular interest. While one particular explanatory theory surrounds the role that social media
could potentially play in influencing investor perceptions of fault or indeed attributing blame to
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one particular cause or party, the above results somewhat diminish this view. While considering
the Facebook, Instagram and Twitter are primarily used for dissemination of information, it is the
latter that is broadly used for the dissemination of news, whether positive, negative or indeed true
or false. While Twitter has been in existence since March 2006, it experienced quite a sharp growth
in the number of continuous monthly users in period after 2009 and 2010. In Q1 2010, Twitter
possessed 30 million monthly users. This increased to 302 million monthly users in Q1 2015 and
330 million monthly users in Q1 2019. While engine manufacturers are largely found to not portray
evidence of detrimental effects in the day immediately after the incident, conditional volatility is
then found to increase somewhat in the sixty-day period thereafter as more robust news continues
to disseminate. On a case-by-case analysis, this finding also holds as the largest cases of conditional
volatility are not found to be as frequent in the period after the rapid growth of this social media
technology. This could indicate that the existence of better quality information could in fact be
changing the manner in which volatility and contagion interact between companies.
4.4. Volatility transmission between the aviation sector to the engine manufacturer
to conclude the research, the paper focuses on the interaction between the returns of the engine
manufacturers and the aviation sector in the aftermath of the aviation disasters. In these selected
samples, there has not been any official announcement as to whether there exist a relationship
between the engines on the aircraft and the cause of the incident itself. While the aviation sector at
large can be susceptible to sharp decreases in valuation in the days following a significant incident,
it is quite alarming from the viewpoint of a provider and developer of engine components to be
susceptible to such volatility, particularly due to influence that such perceptions and reputational
risk can have on the continued development of the associated companies.
Insert Table 11 about here
When considering the short term period after the individual event, a selection of multiple time
frames is considered including that of the 1-, 5-, 10-, 20-, 40- and 60-day periods.8 The final column
presented in both Table 10 and Table 11 represent the entire period in the aftermath of aviation
disasters. When considering the stock return’s conditional variance, it can be seen that there are
substantially fewer significant results in the period. When analysing the results of the interactions
between the dynamic correlations between engine manufacturers and the broad aviation section,
one finds evidence of both elevated and consistent relationships between the sample of incidents
and the aviation sector throughout the entire sixty-day period after. The results indicate that while
a broad number of companies exhibit elevated dynamic correlations, it is those relating to General
Electric, Rolls Royce and United Technologies Corporation that are found to generate substantial
8For brevity, only sector average results have been presented. Individual results are available from the authors on
request.
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sector-wide volatility effects. However, when considering only significant results it returns some very
interesting findings. In the one-day period after the aviation incident, only 30 events, or 4.7% of
engine manufacturer events analysed exhibit elevated levels of dynamic correlation with the aviation
sector. Within the five-day period, this increases to 7.0% and then increases again to almost one-
quarter of the sample ten days after the event (9.7%). This figure is at its largest at twenty days
after the event, representing 11.1% of the sample. One potential explanation for this outcome is
based on the slow dissemination of news in the aftermath of the events. While the airline stocks
themselves are sharply effected by the negative sentiment and reputational damage, it would appear
that initially that the engine manufacturers do not experience the same influence. However, within
ten days, this decoupling effect subsides and there is a substantial positive correlation identified
between the engine manufacturers and the aviation industry. Moreover, this effect tends to be
permanent as it does not disappear mostly after a quarter and even longer periods than that.
5. Concluding Comments
The continued evolution of the aviation sector relies on technological development, with particu-
lar emphasis surrounding the response of the industry to the growing calls to immediately deal with
the carbon emissions disaster that has been escalating in recent years. While structural design and
efficiency improvements will support such efforts, much of the weight of the task will be borne by
engine manufacturers. However, one must understand their role within the sector when considering
the presence of the effects of contagion risks due to accidents involving the airlines to which these
manufacturers supply and the subsequent attributed responsibility for injury and fatality. These
manufacturers are not responsible for the many identified shortcomings that have been identified
in the sector in recents years with regards to poor maintenance which has been attributed to cost-
cutting effects in an extremely competitive environment. However, when an aviation disaster occurs,
there is widespread allocation of blame and responsibility until the true cause is identified. It is
very much of interest to understand as to how such contagion effects influence engine manufactur-
ers and as to how effects relating to asymmetric information and moral hazard can influence their
profitability and potential for growth.
The results provide a variety of explanation based on the varying behaviour and interactions
between these companies in periods of crises. First, when analysing the effects of airline disasters on
engine manufacturer’s profitability and financing structure, the findings reveal that net income falls
sharply in the aftermath of the months following a major aviation disaster that involves an aircraft
that utilises an engine created by one of the engine manufacturers in our sample. Further, there is
evidence of a dampening effect on financial leverage of the company. These results are found to be
robust across a variety of methodological structures, indicating that engine manufacturers have to
contend with substantial income and financial leverage issues in the aftermath of a major aviation
disaster, irrespective of whether they have been identified as a causation factor in the incident
itself. The second stage of our research focuses on the calculation of cumulative abnormal returns
that exist for engine manufacturers in the period after an aviation disaster. Focusing on the overall
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average of CARs, it clearly identifies that there exists a sharp one day loss of 1.64% in the aftermath
of aviation incidents. However, the stock price remains substantially below the market average in
the five days following the disaster. It is very much of interest to note that one hundred and eighty
days after each of the analysed aviation disasters, the calculated CARs of the engine manufacturers
of these airlines are found to have under-performed the market index by over 6.5%.
In the third stage of the analysis, the authors evaluated the changes in stock market volatility
as a result of these disasters. Companies such as General Electric, Rolls Royce, Textron and United
Technology Corporation are found to exhibit quite a substantial increase in share price volatility
during the period immediately following an aircraft incident that included aircraft using their com-
ponents. There is also an interesting observation to be made in the wide-ranging reduction in the
number of statistically significantly volatility events within the designated time period under obser-
vation. One potential explanation for this outcome is based on the slow dissemination of news in
the aftermath of the events. While the airline stocks themselves are sharply effected by the negative
sentiment and reputational damage, it would appear that initially that the engine manufacturers
do not experience the same influence. However, within ten days, this decoupling effect subsides and
there is a substantial positive correlation identified between the engine manufacturers and the avi-
ation industry. Moreover, this effect tends to be permanent as it does not disappear mostly after a
quarter and even longer periods than that. When focusing on the inherent contagion effects of these
incidents, there is evidence to suggest that the largest events relating to companies such as General
Electric, Rolls Royce and United Technology Corporation, all of which possess significant links with
Airbus and Boeing, are found to possess gradually elevated dynamic correlations with the aviation
sector in the sixty day period after such aviation disaster. This suggests that the immediate price
volatility particularly targets the designated engine manufacturer as news and speculation develops
and spreads about the related tragedy. However, over a brief period of time, there is evidence to
suggest that contagion effects take hold as speculation diminishes and more factual evidence arrives.
The changing role of social media must be observed as a significant contributory factor to the
presented results. While considering that the sample incorporated all events identified between
June 1995 and May 2019, there is strong evidence to indicate strong changing dynamics since
January 2010, where a fewer significant interactions have been unidentified in recent times. This is
of particular interest. While one particular explanatory theory surrounds the role that social media
could potentially play in influencing investor perceptions of fault or indeed attributing blame to
one particular cause or party, the above results somewhat diminish this view. Twitter has been
in existence since March 2006, it experienced quite a sharp growth in the number of continuous
monthly users in period after 2009 and 2010. While engine manufacturers are largely found not
to portray evidence of detrimental effects in the day immediately after the incident, conditional
volatility is then found to increase somewhat in the sixty-day period thereafter as more robust news
continues to disseminate. On a case-by-case analysis, this finding also holds as the largest cases of
conditional volatility are not found to be as frequent in the period after the rapid growth of this
social media technology. This could indicate that the existence of better quality information could
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in fact be changing the manner in which volatility and contagion interact between companies.
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Figure 1: Geographic dispersion of fatalities by domicile country of airline, 1996-2019
Note: The above figure presents the geographic dispersion of airline fatalities as represented by the domicile company of the airline that experienced the crash. Data is
between the period 1996 and 2019.
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Figure 2: Number of fatalities per month, 1996-2019
Note: The above figure presents the monthly frequency of airline fatalities. Data is between the period 1996 and 2019.
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Figure 3: Overall Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) in the 180 days after each event
Note: The above figure shows the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) in the 180 days after each event. The red line
represents the date on which the event occurred.
Table 1: Summary statistics for the identified engine manufacturers, engine component suppliers and military engine
suppliers
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Median Maximum Skewness Kurtosis
DJIA 0.0003 0.0109 -0.0787 0.0003 0.1108 -0.0179 8.6229
West Texas Intermediate 0.0004 0.0231 -0.1525 0.0000 0.1783 0.1415 4.4492
Aviation Index 0.0005 0.0115 -0.0751 0.0007 0.1028 -0.1486 9.1538
BAE Systems* 0.0004 0.0194 -0.2458 0.0000 0.1250 -0.6965 12.7372
General Electric 0.0002 0.0187 -0.1279 0.0000 0.1970 0.3071 8.3537
Honeywell International 0.0005 0.0190 -0.1737 0.0000 0.2616 0.0784 12.7131
Leonardo SpA* 0.0003 0.0237 -0.2155 0.0000 0.1996 0.2424 6.0656
Lockheed Martin# 0.0005 0.0161 -0.1376 0.0000 0.1469 -0.0035 7.9517
MTU Aero Engines 0.0008 0.0207 -0.1519 0.0003 0.1636 0.1720 6.3797
Northrop Grumman# 0.0005 0.0158 -0.1462 0.0000 0.2377 0.4670 15.2816
Rolls-Royce 0.0005 0.0211 -0.2243 0.0000 0.1558 0.2509 8.8424
Safron 0.0007 0.0223 -0.3327 0.0000 0.2034 -0.2644 14.2370
Textron 0.0005 0.0241 -0.3165 0.0000 0.4885 0.5876 42.3786
United Technology Corp. 0.0005 0.0164 -0.2825 0.0000 0.1365 -0.6637 18.4291
Note: * indicates a corporation denoted as a component supplier, while # indicates a company that is primarily operational in
military engine supply. We establish the above list noting that each company must be publicly traded with an available stock
ticker between the period June 1, 1995 and May 31,2019. This specific time period is identified due to the relative absence of
concise financial market in the period before. Stock price data is taken from Thomson Reuters Eikon.
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Table 2: Summary statistics of the largest included aviation incidents in the selected sample




Largest Number of Fa-
talities in One Crash
Total Fatalities
1995 23 36.513 159 385
1996 50 63.812 312 1,339
1997 44 51.642 234 904
1998 33 55.991 229 802
1999 25 44.019 217 431
2000 30 47.656 169 747
2001 33 51.441 262 758
2002 27 58.487 225 791
2003 22 34.734 116 318
2004 18 15.438 55 149
2005 32 40.728 149 650
2006 20 50.391 154 523
2007 21 53.269 199 631
2008 31 33.345 154 499
2009 22 56.993 228 470
2010 28 46.171 158 648
2011 32 20.254 77 278
2012 20 44.602 163 356
2013 23 15.436 50 184
2014 16 95.614 298 906
2015 25 32.070 150 259
2016 14 24.279 66 220
2017 8 2.875 7 19
2018 12 60.451 189 425
Totals 610 47.786 312 12,692
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Table 3: Summary statistics of the largest included aviation incidents in the selected sample
Company Count Fatalities Company Count Fatalities Company Count Fatalities Company Count Fatalities
ACES Colombia 1 14 Cameroon Airlines 2 71 Lao Airlines 1 49 Shangri-La Air 1 18
Adamair 3 102 Cebu Pacific Air 1 104 Lapa 1 64 Silkair 1 104
ADC Airlines 4 242 China Airlines 3 428 Laser 1 14 Singapore Airlines 1 83
Aereo Ruta Maya 1 10 China Northern Airlines 1 112 Lion Air 7 214 Skyline Airways 2 14
Aero Servicio Guerrero 1 14 China Southern Airlines 2 35 Lumbini Airways 1 18 SOL Lineas 1 22
Aerocaribbean 2 87 China Yunnan Airlines 1 55 Malaysia Airlines 2 537 Sosoliso Airlines 1 108
Aeroflot 2 88 Comair 2 78 Manaus Aero Taxi 1 24 Spanair 1 154
Aeroperlas 3 20 Continental Connection 1 50 Mandala Airlines 2 149 Sudan Airways 1 116
AeroPeru 1 70 Conviasa 1 17 Merpati 7 31 Sudan Aiways 1 30
Aeroservicios Empresariales 1 16 CrossAir 2 34 Milne Bay Air 2 35 Swiftair 2 116
Afriqiyah Airways 1 103 Cubana 1 112 Necon Air 3 20 Swiss 1 229
Air Algerie 2 102 Dana Air 1 163 Nepal Airlines 2 18 Taesa 1 18
Air Anguilla 1 11 Dirgantara Air Services 1 18 Nigeria Airways 1 11 Taiwan Airlines 1 13
Air Asia 1 162 EAS Airlines 1 149 Nusantara Buana Air 1 18 TAM 1 199
Air Caraibes 1 20 Egyptair 5 297 Ocean Airways 1 20 Tame 3 147
Air China 1 129 Ethiopian Airlines 3 215 One Two Go 1 90 TANS 1 40
Air Fiji 1 17 Faucett 1 123 Overtec 1 13 Tara Air 2 45
Air France 3 228 First Air 3 12 Pakistan Int. Airlines 1 47 Tatarstan Airlines 1 50
Air Guilin 1 17 Fly Corporate 1 13 Parsa 1 10 Thai Airways 2 102
Air India Express 1 158 Fly Dubai 1 62 Paukn Air 1 38 Tracep 1 17
Air Moorea 1 20 Gabon Express 1 19 PenAir 2 10 TransAsia 3 91
Air Philippines 1 131 Garuda Indonesia 4 259 Petropavlosvk-Kham. Air 1 10 Transportes AÃľreos P.G. 1 14
Airblue 1 152 Germanwings 1 150 Proteus Airlines 1 14 Trigana Air 4 60
Aires 2 10 GOL Transportes 1 154 Rico 3 56 Tuninter 1 16
Airline of PNG 1 28 Gulf Air 2 143 Royal Nepal Airlines 2 25 Turkish Airlines 6 84
Airlink 4 32 Gum Air 1 10 RusAir 1 47 TWA 1 230
Alaska Airlines 1 88 Hageland Aviation Services 6 13 S7 Airlines 1 125 United Airlines 7 122
Alliance Air 1 60 HaÃŕti Air Express 1 10 SAL Express 1 16 US Airways 2 21
American Airlines 8 588 Henan Airlines 1 44 SAS 3 114 US-Bangla Airlines 1 51
Armavia 1 113 Hewa Bora 3 117 SASCA 2 15 UTA 1 141
atlasjet 1 57 Iran Air 2 77 SATA Air 1 35 Utair 4 40
Austral 1 74 Iran Aseman Airlines 1 66 Satena es Colombia 2 22 ValuJet 1 110
Aviastar 2 10 Itek Air 1 65 Saudi Arabian Airlines 4 312 Vostok Av. East Air 1 16
Aviateca 1 65 Kam Air 1 104 SAX 1 10 Yemenia Yemen Airways 2 152
Bellview Airlines 1 117 Kenya Airways 2 283 SBA Airlines 1 46 Yeti Airlines 3 27
Bhoja Air 1 127 Korean Air 3 228 SCAT Airlines 2 21
Blue Wing Airlines 3 27 LAM 2 33 Selva Taxi Aereo 1 12
Note: We develop on a combined search of LexisNexis, Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters Eikon, search for the keywords relating to aviation disasters. For added robustness of
our developed dataset, we leverage upon that of the National Transportation Safety Board (available at: https://www.ntsb.gov), the International Civil Aviation Organization,
ICAO (available at: https://www.icao.int) and the Aviation Safety Reporting System (available at: https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov). To obtain a viable observation, a single
observation must be present across each of the selected search engines and the source was denoted as an international news agency, a mainstream domestic news agency or the
company making the announcement itself. All incidents that resulted in less than ten fatalities are omitted for presentation purposes. All companies used in the final dataset
must have been publicly traded at the time of the aviation disaster.
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Table 4: List of airlines that are no longer in operation after a major airline incident
Company No. of Events Fatalities Company No. of Events Fatalities Company No. of Events Fatalities Company No. of Events Fatalities
ACES Colombia 1 14 Binter Mediterraneo 1 4 Nigeria Airways 1 11 Sowind Air 1 4
Adamair 3 102 Blackhwak Int. Air 1 9 Nusantara Buana Air 1 18 Swiss Air* 1 229
ADC Airlines 4 242 Cameroon Airlines 1 71 Ocean Airways 1 20 Taesa 1 18
Aerodat 1 4 CrossAir 2 34 Olson Air Service 1 2 TANS 1 40
AeroPeru 1 70 Dirg. Air Service 1 7 One Two Go Airlines 1 90 Tatarstan Airlines 1 50
AeroTaca 1 5 Dirgantara Air 1 18 Overtec 1 13 Tracep 1 17
Air Fiji 1 17 EAS Airlines 1 149 Pacific Air 1 1 TransAsia 2 91
Air Littoral 1 1 Evolga AVV 1 8 Paradise Air 1 9 Transniugini Airways 1 2
Air Moorea 1 20 Gabon Express 1 19 Proteus Airlines 1 14 TACSA 1 8
Air Satellite 1 7 Guicango 1 7 Regionn Air 1 1 T.A.P. Guatemalteca 1 14
Air Services Guyana 1 3 HaÃŕti Air Express 1 10 Rico 3 56 Tula Air Enterprise 1 4
Airlink 4 32 Henan Air 1 44 RusAir 1 47 TWA (merged with Am. Airways) 1 230
Armavia 1 113 Hewa Bora Air 3 117 SAL Express 1 16 ValuJet 1 110
ATESA 1 5 Itek Air 1 65 SASCA 2 15 Vanair 1 7
Atlantic Southeast Air 1 8 Jetlink Express 1 1 Selva Taxi Aereo 1 12 VARIG 2 1
Avia Air 1 8 Joy General Av. 1 5 Shangri-La Air 1 18 Victoria Air - Equatorial Guinea 2 7
BAL Bremerhaven Air 1 7 Linearea Bolivariana 1 4 Sky Power Express Airlines 1 2 Vincent Aviation 1 5
Bellview Airlines 1 117 Lumbini Air 1 18 Skyline Airways 2 14 Western Straits Air 1 8
Bhoja Air 1 127 Manunggal Air 1 1 Sonic Blue Airways 1 3 Wings of Alaska 1 1
Bigfoot Air 1 4 Necon Air 2 20 Sosoliso Airlines 1 108
Note: We develop on a combined search of LexisNexis, Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters Eikon, search for the keywords relating to aviation disasters. For brevity, the following companies were removed
from the above list as the sole incidents associated with each did not result in fatalities: Aero Continente; Aerobol - Aerovias Bolivar; Aerolineas Nacionales - ANSA Panama; Aerotaxi; Air Afrique; Air
Gabon; Air Hi-O; Air Quarius; Air Saint Barth; Airlink Papua New Guinea; Allegro; America West (merged with US Airways); LMT; Mauritania Aiways; Pacific Island Air; PacificAir; Regionnair;
TransGuyana Airways; Vanua Air Charter; VASP; Viarco; VoronezAvia; Weasua Air Transport; West Coast Air; West Star Aviation and Wind Jet. For added robustness of our developed dataset, we
leverage upon that of the National Transportation Safety Board (available at: https://www.ntsb.gov), the International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO (available at: https://www.icao.int) and the
Aviation Safety Reporting System (available at: https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov). To obtain a viable observation, a single observation must be present across each of the selected search engines and the source
was denoted as an international news agency, a mainstream domestic news agency or the company making the announcement itself. All companies used in the final dataset must have been publicly
traded at the time of the aviation disaster. *Swiss Air has subsequently been re-branded to Swiss and is now part of the Lufthansa group.
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Table 5: Summary statistics as separated by publicly traded airline-type involved in major incident
Airline Type Occurrences Fatalities Airline Type Occurrences Fatalities Airline Type Occurrences Fatalities
Airbus A300 5 0 Boeing 737-400 12 124 De Havilland DHC-3 Otter 4 9
Airbus A300-600 3 699 Boeing 737-500 5 152 De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 45 361
Airbus A310 6 577 Boeing 737-700 2 2 Douglas C-47 Skytrain (DC-3) 1 0
Airbus A319 1 0 Boeing 737-800 16 588 Douglas DC-10 2 3
Airbus A320 17 841 Boeing 747-100 3 542 Douglas DC-3 3 14
Airbus A321 2 152 Boeing 747-200 3 225 Douglas DC-9 20 458
Airbus A330 3 331 Boeing 747-300 3 228 Embraer EMB-110 Bandeirante 15 102
Airbus A340-300 1 0 Boeing 747-400 2 83 Embraer EMB-120 BrasÃŋlia 10 100
Airbus A340-600 1 0 Boeing 747SP 1 0 Embraer EMB-820 Navajo 1 4
ATR42-300 11 119 Boeing 757-200 5 339 Embraer ERJ-135 1 0
ATR42-500 3 48 Boeing 767-200 5 411 Embraer ERJ-145 5 0
ATR72-200 14 184 Boeing 767-300 3 217 Embraer ERJ-190 5 77
ATR72-500 3 48 Boeing 777-200 6 540 GAF Nomad N22 1 0
ATR72-600 2 92 Boeing 777-300 1 0 GAF Nomad N24 4 20
Avro 748 8 34 Britten-Norman Islander 25 67 Grumman G-159 Gulfstream I 1 0
Avro RJ100 4 99 Britten-Norman Trislander 1 0 Grumman G-21A Goose 2 2
Avro RJ70 1 0 Canadair RegionalJet CRJ-100 5 2 Grumman G-73 Mallard 1 20
BAc 111 5 150 Canadair RegionalJet CRJ-200 4 126 IAI 1124 Westwind 1 0
BAe 146 4 38 Casa 212 Aviocar 8 59 Lockheed L-1011 TriStar 1 0
BAe ATP 2 50 Casa-Nurtanio CN235 (IPTN) 1 4 McDonnell Douglas MD-11 2 232
BAe Jetstream 31 15 50 Cessna 207 Skywagon/Stationair 7 19 McDonnell Douglas MD-81 1 0
Bae Jetstream 41 2 0 Cessna 208 Caravan 29 81 McDonnell Douglas MD-82 10 392
Beechcraft 100 King Air 2 2 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan 14 43 McDonnell Douglas MD-83 8 424
Beechcraft 1900C 6 28 Cessna 402 9 43 McDonnell Douglas MD-87 1 114
Beechcraft 1900D 4 36 Cessna 404 Titan 2 4 McDonnell Douglas MD-88 1 0
Beechcraft 200 Super King Air 4 1 Cessna 406 Caravan 1 2 McDonnell Douglas MD-90 2 0
Beechcraft 300 Super King Air 1 4 Cessna 414 Chancellor 1 3 Mitsubishi MU-2 Marquise 1 0
Beechcraft 99 Airliner 5 12 Cessna 421 Golden Eagle 1 8 PZL-Mielec AN-2 19 15
Beechcraft G18 1 1 Cessna 425 Conquest 1 0 PZL-Mielec AN-28 11 96
Beechcraft H18 1 0 Convair CV-580 1 0 Saab 340 8 45
Boeing 707 3 3 De Havilland Dash-7 2 0 Short 330 1 0
Boeing 727-100 2 171 De Havilland Dash-8-100 4 28 Short 360 2 0
Boeing 727-200 13 415 De Havilland Dash-8-200 2 0 Transall C-160 1 1
Boeing 737 MAX 8 2 346 De Havilland Dash-8-300 2 0 Tupolev TU-134 1 47
Boeing 737-200 40 1573 De Havilland Dash-8-400 7 101 Tupolev TU-154 2 3
Boeing 737-300 16 140 De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver 5 18 Yakovlev Yak-40 5 7
Note: We develop on a combined search of LexisNexis, Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters Eikon, search for the keywords relating to aviation disasters. For added robustness of
our developed dataset, we leverage upon that of the National Transportation Safety Board (available at: https://www.ntsb.gov), the International Civil Aviation Organization,
ICAO (available at: https://www.icao.int) and the Aviation Safety Reporting System (available at: https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov). To obtain a viable observation, a single
observation must be present across each of the selected search engines and the source was denoted as an international news agency, a mainstream domestic news agency or the
company making the announcement itself. All companies used in the final dataset must have been publicly traded at the time of the aviation disaster.
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Table 6: Summary statistics as separated by publicly traded engine supplier to airlines involved in major incident
Company Count Fatalities
BAE Systems∗ 71 1,603
General Electric 30 1,269
Leonardo SpA∗ 33 491
Lockheed Martin # 31 125
MTU Aero Systems 19 116
Rolls Royce 157 3,938
Safran 19 1,187
Textron 90 290
United Technologies Corp 160 3,926
Total 610 14,400
Note: ∗ indicates a corporation denoted as a component supplier, while # indicates a company that is primarily operational in military engine supply. We develop on a
combined search of LexisNexis, Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters Eikon, search for the keywords relating to aviation disasters. For added robustness of our developed dataset,
we leverage upon that of the National Transportation Safety Board (available at: https://www.ntsb.gov), the International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO (available at:
https://www.icao.int) and the Aviation Safety Reporting System (available at: https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov). To obtain a viable observation, a single observation must be present
across each of the selected search engines and the source was denoted as an international news agency, a mainstream domestic news agency or the company making the
announcement itself. All companies used in the final dataset must have been publicly traded at the time of the aviation disaster.
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Table 7: Modelling the impact of aviation disasters on firms’ profitability and financing structure (Regression analysis, levels)
Dep. Var: Income Leverage
Model Specification M1 M2 M3 MAll M1 M2 M3 MAll
Market Cap -0.8242 -0.2325 -0.0179 -0.0236
(1.4670) (0.1590) (0.0231) (0.0252)
Book to Market Ratio 1.0903 0.1139 -0.0014 0.0030
(0.7680) (0.8102) (0.0121) (0.0128)
Returns (Qt−1) -0.0110 -0.0114 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Returns (Qt−4 - Qt−2) 0.0021 0.0019*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0000) (0.0000)
β 0.9928 0.1126* -0.0375 -0.0193
(2.4382) (0.2584) (0.0384) (0.0410)
Stock Price 0.7991*** 1.0612*** 0.0309 0.0152
(0.2398) (0.2656) (0.0380) (0.0421)
Turnover Ratio 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Amihud Ratio 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Age 0.1255* 0.1788*** -0.2390** -0.1979
(0.0736) (0.0811) (0.1155) (0.1285)
Dividend Yield -0.3210 -0.4413 0.9612 1.4661*
(0.4252) (0.4891) (0.6670) (0.7754)
Benchmark Index 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Volatility -0.4071 -0.2412 -0.1286 -0.1378
(0.7091) (0.7245) (0.1112) (0.1148)
γ -0.6687*** -0.6792*** -0.7419*** -0.7112*** -0.6152*** -0.3837*** -0.9915*** -0.4552***
(0.1312) (0.1288) (0.1320) (0.1391) (0.0207) (0.0038) (0.2070) (0.0220)
Note: Table displays the results of the regression Yt+1 = α+ βXt + γNamet + εt where Y is either net income or financial leverage, and Xt are the control set. The values in
the parentheses are standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 8: Modelling the impact of aviation disasters on firms’ profitability and financing structure (Robustness test, first-difference)
Dep. Var: Income Leverage
Model Specification M1 M2 M3 MAll M1 M2 M3 MAll
Market Cap -0.80324* -0.69049 0.035198 0.021489
(0.44077) (0.57971) (0.10658) (0.14128)
Book to Market Ratio 1.242657*** 5.780171*** 0 -0.00025
(0.68703) (1.89721) (0.00012) (0.00049)
Returns (Qt−1) 1.255625 0.62701 -0.00099 -0.00099
(0.93539) (0.94021) (0.00222) (0.00235)
Returns (Qt−4 - Qt−2) 0.280716 0.048783 -0.00012 -0.00012
(1.6386) (1.64823) (0.00037) (0.00037)
β 0.491407*** 0.928103*** -0.24762 -0.21761
(0.13375) (0.13881) (0.3232) (0.33827)
Stock Price 2.186444 0.92835 0.045201 0.110039
(1.73456) (1.02209) (0.16549) (0.2491)
Turnover Ratio 0*** 0*** 0*** 0***
(0) (0) (0) (0)
Amihud Ratio 0*** 0*** 0*** 0***
(0.00012) (0.00012) (0) (0)
Age -0.17179 0.336167 0.17006 0.123994
(0.1892) (0.29949) (0.67913) (0.72989)
Dividend Yield 1.307371*** 0.832143*** 0.001853 0.017908
(0.62948) (0.17994) (0.02137) (0.04384)
Benchmark Index -0.4869 -0.84268 -0.56849 -1.40447
(0.54735) (0.67023) (1.33084) (1.63316)
Volatility 1.1015*** 0.368366*** -0.00049 0.000491
(0.29578) (0.31641) (0.00716) (0.00766)
γ -0.48285*** -0.48105*** -0.44194*** -0.47541*** -0.35806*** -0.35778*** -0.33357*** -0.28603***
(0.080855) (0.027565) (0.013412) (0.013795) (0.032975) (0.033012) (0.032604) (0.033629)
Note: Table displays the results of the regression ∆Yt+1 = Yt+1 − Yt = α+ βXt + γIncidentt + εt where Y is either net income or financial leverage, and Xt are the control
set. The values in the parentheses are standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 9: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) per engine manufacturer in the aftermath of an aviation disaster
Day after event 0 1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 30 40 50 60 90 180
BAE Systems∗ -9.16% -9.56% -9.44% -9.75% -9.68% -10.22% -8.80% -7.12% -2.78% -3.49% -5.91% -5.99% -9.45% -7.73% -9.13%
General Electric -0.32% -0.59% -0.56% -0.58% -0.50% -0.34% -1.47% -2.11% -2.15% -2.64% -2.71% -3.29% -3.31% -3.42% -12.04%
Honeywell International -2.84% -2.89% -2.55% -3.84% -5.98% -6.70% -6.58% -6.97% -5.64% -9.11% -10.45% -8.95% -10.82% -16.75% -16.13%
Leonardo SpA∗ -2.38% -2.08% -2.32% -2.92% -3.10% -3.19% -2.81% -1.84% -1.73% -4.06% -6.58% -8.15% -12.05% -9.76% -15.99%
Lockheed Martin # 0.04% -0.18% -0.62% -0.87% -0.70% -0.83% -2.26% -1.95% -3.00% -0.52% -1.11% -1.68% 0.83% 2.15% 5.76%
Northrop Grumman # -0.83% -1.02% -0.80% -0.47% -0.49% -0.48% 0.24% -0.23% -0.61% -1.09% -1.59% -1.54% -1.62% -3.13% -1.00%
Rockwell Automation∗ 0.20% 0.20% 0.22% 0.40% 0.71% 0.85% 0.26% 0.13% -0.02% -1.24% -1.33% -2.10% -2.51% -1.31% -1.23%
Rolls Royce -1.52% -1.13% -1.28% -1.10% -0.83% -0.90% -1.18% -1.57% -2.37% -3.09% -3.69% -4.47% -4.39% -4.29% -6.82%
Safran -0.75% -0.85% -0.96% -1.00% -0.71% -0.55% -0.88% -0.84% -1.05% -1.11% -1.57% -2.09% -4.21% -4.17% -5.72%
Textron -0.18% -0.23% 0.10% 0.11% 0.25% 0.38% 0.09% -1.31% -0.27% 0.42% -0.92% -1.37% -1.78% -1.92% -3.36%
United Tech. Corp -0.24% -0.26% 0.00% 0.00% -0.22% -0.30% 0.07% -0.72% -0.75% -1.60% -2.40% -3.66% -4.76% -3.95% -8.18%
Average -1.64% -1.69% -1.66% -1.82% -1.93% -2.03% -2.12% -2.23% -1.85% -2.50% -3.48% -3.94% -4.92% -4.93% -6.71%
Note: The above table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) in the 180 days after each aviation incidents. ∗ indicates a corporation denoted as a component
supplier, while # indicates a company that is primarily operational in military engine supply.
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Table 10: Number of companies experiencing an increase in their stock returns’ conditional variances in the denoted period after an aviation incidents
Significant positive dummy coefficient
Company D1d D5d D10d D20d D40d D60d DAlld
BAE Systems* 2 2 2 0 1 0 4
General Electric 14 14 14 14 10 7 3
Leonardo SpA* 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Lockheed Martin# 4 4 3 3 2 3 2
Rockwell Automation* 0 0 0 1 1 1 2
Rolls Royce 18 17 16 12 19 14 14
Safran 3 2 2 0 1 0 2
Textron 11 12 9 6 7 7 18
United Technology Corp 23 18 21 17 20 12 20
Note: * indicates a corporation denoted as a component supplier, while # indicates a company that is primarily operational in military engine supply. Individual results are
available from the authors on request. This table presents the statistical results on the positive dummy coefficients estimated in the following EGARCH model
ln(h2t ) = ω + αεt−1 + γ(|εt−1|−E(|εt−1|)) + β ln(h2t−1) +Dt. Before estimating the EGARCH model, returns are filtrated through the process provided in equation (5).
Values in this table show the number of companies that experience an increase in their stock returns’ conditional volatility after aviation incidents. The column headers show
the number of days that we analyse the volatility increase after the aviation incidents. The values in the parentheses are the percentage of companies within the sub-groups
experiencing an increase in their stock returns’ conditional volatility. The above table reports the number of companies that experience a significantly higher conditional
volatility in their stock returns.
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Table 11: Number of events initiating an increase in their stock returns’ dynamic correlation with aviation index by company
Significant positive dummy coefficient
company D1d D5dt D10dt D20dt D40dt D60dt DAllt
BAE Systems* 0 0 1 1 1 1 2
General Electric 23 24 30 36 32 32 40
Leonardo SpA* 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Lockheed Martin# 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rockwell Automation* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rolls Royce 5 14 22 22 22 20 23
Safran 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Textron 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
United Technology Corp 2 3 4 10 12 12 24
Note: * indicates a corporation denoted as a component supplier, while # indicates a company that is primarily operational in military engine supply. Individual results are
available from the authors on request. The above panel presents the statistical results on the significant positive dummy coefficients estimated in the following regression
ρti,avi = α+Dt + εt. ρ
t denotes the dynamic conditional correlations, i stands for the selected company’s returns, avi is the returns of the benchmark index where .... Dt is a
dummy variable that takes the value one for a certain period of time after aviation incidents. Values in this table show the number of companies that experience a change in
their stock returns’ correlation between the above mentioned indices after aviation incidents. The column headers show the number of days that we analyse the correlation
change after the announcements. The values in the parentheses are the percentage of companies within the sub-groups experiencing a change in correlations.
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